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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant

was not

seized when Officer Knighton and her partner blocked

Defendant's truck by parking nose-to-nose with the truck and then
activated her "takedown lights" and high-beam lights upon Defendant's
truck prior to questioning Defendant and the co-passengers of the
truck.

The trial court's ultimate determination of the level of stop

is a legal conclusion that is afforded no deference on appeal and is
reviewed for correctness.

State

(Utah App. 1994) (citing United
(D.C. Cir.), cert,

denied,

v. Bean,
States

869 P.2d 984, 985 & n.2

v. Maragh,

894 F.2d 415, 417

498 U.S. 880, 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990)).

This

issue was preserved by way of trial counsel's motion to suppress
together with the evidence and argument presented at the suppression
hearing

(R. 45-63, Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 23-26,

Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Officer

Knighton had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had either committed
a crime, was in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to
commit a crime when Defendant merely parked his truck and no one at
any time exited the truck prior to the seizure and investigative
questioning.

The "determination of whether a specific set of facts

gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is
4

reviewable nondeferentially for correctness."
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see also
1272 (Utah 1993); State
cert,

denied,

v.

Bello,

State

State

v. Thurman,

v.

Pena,

8 69

846 P.2d 1256,

871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App.),

883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

This issue was preserved by

way of trial counsel's motion to suppress together with the evidence
and

argument

presented

at the

suppression

hearing

(R. 45-63,

Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 23-26, Ruling on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

13

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By way of Information filed on March 7, 1995, and amended on
April 4, 1995, Defendant was charged with

(1) Possession of a

Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i); (2) Driving While Under the Influence
of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; (3) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. On
April

25, 1995, Defendant

appeared with appointed

counsel for

Arraignment before the district court and pleaded not guilty.
5

Thereafter, on May 19, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed
counsel for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, after which
the district court took the matter under advisement.

On June 6,

1995, the district court, by way of its Ruling on Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. At the Pretrial
Conference on September 12, 1995, Defendant entered a conditional
plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance with the other
two counts being dismissed.
11, 1995.

Notice of Appeal was filed on October

By way of Memorandum Decision, filed December 29, 1995,

this Court summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
due to the lack of a final judgment.

Pursuant to the Stipulation on

the conditional plea of guilty, filed on April 23, 1996, the district
court, signed the Judgment on May 23, 1996, which was entered on May
24, 1996, sentencing, inter

alia,

Defendant to an indeterminate term

of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, which was stayed
pending determination of Defendant's appeal.

Defendant filed Notice

of Appeal on June 24, 1996.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 3, 1995, at approximately 9:58 p.m., Officer

Eileen Knighton, a Deputy Paramedic with the Davis County Sheriff's
Office (R. 47, Transcript of Suppression Hearing), was patrolling
westbound on Center Street in North Salt Lake (R. 8-11, Transcript of
Suppression Hearing);
2.

In the course of patrolling, Officer Knighton observed

Defendant's truck traveling westbound on Center Street "half a mile
6

or so" ahead of Deputy Knighton's patrol vehicle (R. 48, lines 13-14,
Transcript of Suppression Hearing);
3.

The area being patrolled by Officer Knighton was an open

field area with some construction taking place on a bridge where
Center Street and the Jordan River intersect (R. 47-48, Transcript of
Suppression Hearing)/
4.

As Defendant's truck approached the construction area,

Officer Knighton "became curious to know where they were going down
there" (R. 48, lines 13-17, Transcript of Suppression Hearing);
5.

Officer Knighton observed Defendant's truck turn and back

up towards the barricades or signs surrounding the construction area
so that the truck faced east (R. 48, lines 17-19, R. 51, lines 21-22,
Transcript of Suppression Hearing), after which Defendant stopped the
truck and turned off the headlights (R. 48, lines 17-18, Transcript
of Suppression Hearing).

The construction vehicles and supplies

located in the construction area were located approximately two
hundred feet away from the area where Defendant stopped his truck (R.
51, lines 1-13, Transcript of Suppression Hearing);
6.

At no time during the events in question did Defendant or

any of his co-passengers ever exit Defendant's truck and go towards
the construction area (R. 52, lines 14-19, Transcript of Suppression
Hearing);
7.

Officer Knighton and her partner proceeded to Defendant's

location "to determine why the individual had stopped there" (R. 48,
lines 22-23, Transcript of Suppression Hearing).

7

As they proceeded,

Officer Knighton had a "suspicion" of criminal activity (R. 51-52,
Transcript of Suppression Hearing), which, according to Officer
Knighton's testimony, was based on the construction equipment located
in the general vicinity, the lateness of the hour, i.e., 9:58 p.m.,
and that criminal activity often occurs in that area

(R. 54,

Transcript of Suppression Hearing);
8.

In the course of proceeding to Defendant's location,

Officer Knighton turned off all of the lights on the patrol vehicle
(R. 48-49, Transcript of Suppression Hearing).

Officer Knighton then

approached Defendant's truck until her patrol vehicle was "nose to
nose" with Defendant's truck, at which time she then activated her
high-beam headlights and clear white "takedown lights" located in the
light bar on top of the patrol vehicle (R. 49, lines 5-17, Transcript
of Suppression Hearing);'
9.

Upon activating her high-beam headlights and "takedown

lights," to illuminate Defendant's area, Officer Knighton observed
three individuals in the truck - two males and a female - who looked
up towards the patrol vehicle (R. 49-50, Transcript of Suppression
Hearing), at which time Officer Knighton stated that she "felt some
movement,

some

secretive

Suppression Hearing).

movement"

(R.

49-50,

Transcript

of

Officer Knighton's vehicle was a marked patrol

vehicle with law enforcement decals on the doors and the light bar on
the top of the vehicle (R. 53, lines 3-7, Transcript of Suppression
Hearing).

In addition to the clear white "takedown lights," the

light bar on the top of the patrol vehicle had the traditional red

8

and blue lights in addition to grill lights in the front grill of the
patrol vehicle (R. 53-54, Transcript of Suppression Hearing);
10.

Officer Knighton then approached the vehicle and conducted

an "investigation," which resulted in the discovery of a controlled
substance that served as the basis for Defendant's conviction;
11.

By way of Information filed on March 7, 1995, and amended

on April 4, 1995, Defendant was charged with (1) Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); (2) Driving While Under the Influence
of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; (3) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (R.
17-18, Amended Information);
12.

On April 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed

counsel for Arraignment before the district court and pleaded not
guilty (R. 19, Minute Entry);
13.

Defendant subsequently appeared with appointed counsel on

May 19, 1995, for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, after
which the district court took the matter under advisement (R. 61,
lines 21-22, Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 22, Minute Entry);
14.

On June 6, 1995, the district court, by way of its Ruling

on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, denied Defendant's Motion to
Suppress (R. 23-26, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress).

In

its Ruling, the district court concluded that no detention occurred
at the moment Officer Knighton activated her high-beam and "takedown"

9

lights (R. 24, Rule on Defendant's Motion to Suppress).
court further concluded that, assuming arguendo
occur,

"Deputy

Knighton

had

reasonable

The district

that a detention did
suspicion,

based

on

articulable facts, that Defendant had either committed a crime, was
in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to commit a
crime" (R. 24-25, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress);
15.

At the Pretrial Conference on September 12, 1995, Defendant

entered a conditional plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled
Substance with the other two counts being dismissed (R. 87, lines 29, and R. 93, lines 5-7, Transcript of Pretrial Conference);
16.

Notice of Appeal was filed on October 11, 1995 (R. 35-37,

Notice of Appeal);
17.

By way of Memorandum Decision, filed December 29, 1995, the

Utah Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction due to the lack of a final judgment (R. 84 and 98,
Memorandum Decision);
18.

Pursuant to Stipulation on the conditional plea of guilty,

filed on April 23, 1996 (R. 104, Stipulation on Plea), the district
court, signed the Judgment on May 23, 1996, which was entered on May
24, 1996, sentencing Defendant, inter

alia,

to an indeterminate term

of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, which was stayed
pending determination of Defendant's appeal (R. 105-06, Judgment);
19.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on June 24, 1996 (R. 107-

09, Notice of Appeal).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court erred in determining that Defendant was not

seized when Officer Knighton, with her partner, parked the patrol
vehicle

nose-to-nose

with

Defendant's

truck,

thereby

blocking

Defendant's truck, and then activated both the "takedown lights" and
high beam headlights of the patrol vehicle prior to continuing
investigation of Defendant and his co-passengers.

In the course of

its Fourth Amendment analysis, the trial court erred in its analysis
of the level of stop by utilizing an inquiry that is too narrow and
thereby failing to consider the totality of the circumstances. Based
on

the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's

liberty was

restrained and a seizure occurred at the point Officer Knighton and
her partner covertly approached and parked the marked patrol vehicle
nose-to-nose to Defendant's truck and turned on both her high-beam
headlights and "takedown lights" to illuminate Defendant's truck.

By

so doing, Officer Knighton effectively blocked Defendant's truck and
then utilized a show of authority to detain Defendant for the purpose
of continuing the investigation of Defendant.
2.

The trial court erred by concluding that Officer Knighton

had a reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant committed or was
about to commit a crime prior to seizing Defendant when Defendant
merely parked his truck and no one exited the truck at any time prior
to the seizure and investigative questioning by Officer Knighton.
Notwithstanding Officer Knighton's testimony that the situation was
suspicious, neither she nor her partner could point to specific

11

objective facts to support her hunch or suspicion.

Rather, Officer

Knighton was merely "curious" about where Defendant was going.
Because Officer Knighton did not articulate reasonable objective
facts for suspecting Struhs had engaged in or was about to engage in
criminal conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime
prevention and constitutional right of Struhs to personal security
and privacy tilts in favor of Struhs to protect Struhs from the
unreasonable police interference.

The seizure by Office Knighton of

Struhs was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure should be
suppressed.
ARGUMENTS
1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT
WAS NOT SEIZED WHEN OFFICER KNIGHTON, ALONG WITH HER
PARTNER, PARKED THE PATROL VEHICLE NOSE-TO-NOSE WITH
DEFENDANT'S TRUCK, THEREBY BLOCKING THE TRUCK, AND
THEN ACTIVATED BOTH THE "TAKEDOWN LIGHTS" AND HIGHBEAM HEADLIGHTS OF THE PATROL VEHICLE PRIOR TO THE
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT.

Because a Fourth Amendment1 analysis of police officer conduct
is fact sensitive, the facts are reviewed in detail.
Jackson,

805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 1990); State

v.

State
Sierra,

v.
754

P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988). A trial court's determination of the
level of stop is a legal conclusion that is afforded no deference on
appeal and is reviewed for correctness. State
x

v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984,

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."
12

985 & n.2 (Utah App. 1994) (citing United
415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert,
(1990)); see also
1991), cert,

State

denied,

denied,

v. Carter,

States

v. Maragh,

894 F.2d

498 U.S. 880, 111 S.Ct. 214

812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 (Utah App.

836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that people have the right to be secure in their persons and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment functions to "prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference
by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of
individuals."

United States

v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100

S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) (citations omitted).
The search and seizures limitations of the Fourth Amendment
apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that fall short of
official arrests.
(1968).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880

"A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs

only when the officer by means of physical force or show of authority
has in some way restricted the liberty of a person."
Trujillo,

739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Mendenhall,

U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. At 1876 (citing Terry,
88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16)).
totality

State

v.
446

392 U.S. at 19, n.16,

"When a reasonable person, based on the

of the circumstances, remains, not

in the spirit of

cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believes
he is not free to leave a seizure occurs."

Id.

446 U.S. at 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877).

13

(citing

Mendenhall,

In State

v. Deitman,

739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam),

the

Utah Supreme Court acknowledged three levels of police encounters
with the public that are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the "detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
Id.

at 616-17 (quoting United

(5th Cir. 1984), cert,
(1986)) .

Because

denied
the

States

v. Merritt,

736 F.2d 223, 230

sub nom. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250,

above-mentioned

demarcations

are

often

difficult to apply, the appellate court "must not only balance the
competing

interests of the individual

and the State but also

carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each particular
State

case."

v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah App. 1990).

Further,

characterization of the encounter between an officer and a defendant
must be determined by examining the "totality of the circumstances."
See State

v. Smith,

781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989).

A level one stop "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time."
State

v. Jackson,

805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990), cert,

815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); accord

Carter,

812 P.2d at 463.

denied,
These

consensual and voluntary discussions between citizens and police

14

officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994); Jackson,

805 P.2d

at 768.
In contrast to a level one stop, a level two stop, or a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer
"*by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way
restrained the liberty'" of a person. Mendenhall,
100 S.Ct. at 1876 (quoting Terry,

446 U.S. at 552,

392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at

1899 n.16); accord

Trujillo,

seizure occurred

is objective and depends on when the person

739 P.2d at 87. "The test for when the

reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks the
person is no longer free to leave." State
786 (Utah 1991); see also Mendenhall,
1877; Jackson,
In State

v. Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774,

446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at

805 P.2d at 767.
v.

Smith,

781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989), this Court

held that a seizure had occurred when the officer followed Smith into
a parking lot and blocked Smith's car after Smith had made a turn
without signaling.

The totality of the circumstances underlying the

Court's determination that Smith's liberty had been restrained and
that a seizure had occurred were that the officer initiated the stop
with either his overhead lights or spot light and blocked Smith's
car, got out the marked police car to talk to Smith late at night,
asked for Smith's license and registration, issued Smith a traffic
citation, and required Smith to remain while he did a warrants check
and called for a backup officer.

Id.
15

at 882.

In Smith,

the Court

noted that other jurisdictions have held that when an officer blocks
a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurs "even though the original stop was not initiated by
the officer."

Id at 882 n.3; see People

v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435, 440

(1982) (holding that although the initial stop of defendant's vehicle
in a driveway was not the result of the officer's actions, his
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to defendant's
car clearly constituted a detention of the automobile and would be
the equivalent of a police-initiated "stop"); United

States

v.

Kerr,

817 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that seizure occurred
because it was not possible for defendant to drive around the
officer's car and defendant stopped and exited his car primarily in
response to the police officer's official appearance and conduct
rather than of this own volition).
The trial court, in the instant case, concluded that the
encounter between Officer Knighton and Struhs was. a level one
encounter.

See R. 24, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

In

the course of so concluding, the trial court focused upon whether or
not the use of the * takedown lights" as opposed to the other red and
blue lights on the patrol vehicle light bar constituted a detention
subject to Fourth Amendment protection.2
2

Id.

The trial court erred

In the course of focusing on the "takedown lights" issue, the
trial court based its determination on the underlying facts or lack
thereof pertaining to the use of overhead lights by the officer in
State
v. Davis,
821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) . Davis, however, is
distinguishable from the instant case because the police officer in
Davis had not been detained, even momentarily, and "could have
reasonably believed that he was free to drive away as the officer
16

in its analysis of the level of stop by utilizing an inquiry that is
too narrow and thereby failing to consider the totality of the
circumstances.

See Smith,

781 P.2d at 881. While the utilization by

Officer Knighton of her *takedown lights" as opposed to the other
lights on the light bar of the patrol vehicle is relevant, it is not
dispositive. Another consideration is whether Defendant

"remain[ed],

not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation,
but because he believe [ed] he [was] not free to leave. . . ."
Trujillo,

739 P.2d at 87 (emphasis added).

The instant case is not a case where the police officer pulls
along side a defendant's car without the use of lights or sirens and
merely asks for identification or explanation. See Bountiful
Maestas,

788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990).

City

v.

Moreover, this is not a

case where the defendant, prior to having his vehicle blocked by the
officer's patrol vehicle, exited his car and approached the officer
of his own volition.
Based

See Jackson,

805 P.2d at

767-68.

on a review of the totality of the circumstances,

Defendant's liberty was restrained and a seizure occurred at the
point Officer Knighton and her partner covertly approached and parked
the marked patrol vehicle nose-to-nose to Defendant's truck and

pulled up in his vehicle." Id. at 12. Further, unlike the instant
case, the police officer in Davis,
as he pulled behind the
defendant's car, observed a can of beer on the trunk of the car, an
open passenger door, and a man urinating, which created a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that a crime had been committed.
Id.
Finally, in contrast to the case at bar, nothing in the record
in Davis suggested that formal investigation into possible criminal
wrongdoing had begun when the officer first arrived.
Id.
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turned both her high-beam headlights and "takedown

lights" on

Defendant's truck. By so doing, Officer Knighton effectively blocked
Defendant's truck and then utilized a show of authority to detain
Defendant

for

the purpose

of

continuing

the

investigation

of

Defendant.

2.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT MERELY PARKED HIS TRUCK AND NO ONE
EXITED THE TRUCK AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SEIZURE AND
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING BY OFFICER KNIGHTON, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT OFFICER KNIGHTON
HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED OR
WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME.

In order to justify a seizure, like that in the instant case,
the police officer must "point to specific, articulable facts which,
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead
a reasonable person to conclude Struhs had committed or was about to
commit a crime." State v. Trujillo,
(citing Florida
(1983); Terry
and State

v.

Royer,

v. Ohio,

v. Christensen,

In Terry

v.

Ohio,

739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)

460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324

392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968);
676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984)).
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968),

the United States Supreme Court stated:
And in making that assessment it is imperative
that the facts be judged against an objective
standard:
would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
in the belief" that the action taken was
appropriate?
Anything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
18

consistently refused to sanction. And simple
"*good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough'. . . ."
Id.

at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80 (citations omitted).
Utah

codified

this

constitutionally

mandated

"reasonable

suspicion" at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, which states:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand a name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
According to § 77-7-15, a "brief investigatory stop of an individual
by

police

officers

is permissible

when

the

officers

*have a

reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual
is involved in criminal activity.'" State
675 (Utah 1986) (quoting State
1985)); State v. Christensen,
In State

v.

Carpena,

v. Swanigan,

v. Carpena,

714 P.2d 674,

699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah

676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984).
714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), a

police officer, who was patrolling a neighborhood in which a number
of burglaries had recently occurred, observed, at 3:00 a.m., a slowly
moving vehicle with Arizona plates. Id.

at 675. The officer did not

observe a traffic offense and had no report of a recent burglary.
Id.

The vehicle pulled into a driveway of a house where one of the

occupants resided.

Id.

Because there were no objective facts on

which to base a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car
were involved in criminal activity, the Utah Supreme Court held the
investigatory stop unconstitutional.
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Id.

As in Carpena,

the Utah Supreme Court, in State

v. Swanigan,

699

P.2d 718 (Utah 1985 (per curiam), held the stop unconstitutional.
Id.

at 719. In that case, the police officer, at approximately 1:40

a.m., stopped two persons walking down a street.

Id.

The seizure

was based on a description by a fellow police officer who had
observed the two individuals walking along the street at a late hour
in an area where a recent burglary had been reported.

Id.

In that

case, the officer saw them neither at the scene of the crime nor did
he see them engage in any criminal activity.

Id.

Applying the aforementioned principles of law and authority, the
totality of the circumstances preceding the seizure of Struhs does
not support a reasonable suspicion that Struhs was involved in
criminal conduct. Officer Knighton did not, at any time prior to the
seizure, observe Defendant or his co-passengers engage in any type of
criminal conduct. Brown v. Texas,
Carpena,

443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979);

714 P.2d at 675; Swanigan,

699 P.2d at 719.

Rather the

initial decision to seize Struhs was based merely on the lateness of
the hour, the construction zone in the area, and the alleged highcrime factor in the area.

Cf.

Trujillo,

739 P.2d at 89.

There is

nothing in the record indicating that it was unusual for people to be
driving and parking in the manner that Officer Knighton observed on
the night in question.
Notwithstanding Officer Knighton's testimony that the situation
was suspicious, neither she nor her partner could point to specific
objective facts to support her hunch or suspicion.
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Rather, Officer

Knighton was merely "curious" about where Defendant was going.

In

short, there is nothing distinguishing Struhs' activity from that of
any other citizen driving in the area, especially since Struhs did
not

exit

the vehicle when

it came

to a stop

and

since the

construction area was approximately two hundred yards away.
Because Officer Knighton did not articulate reasonable objective
facts for suspecting Struhs had engaged in or was about to engage in
criminal conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime
prevention and constitutional right of Struhs to personal security
and privacy tilts in favor of Struhs to protect Struhs from the
unreasonable police interference.

The seizure by Office Knighton of

Struhs was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure should be
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this Court's opinion so that Defendant's constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures might be effectuated.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which are matters of
continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and
public.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of

disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hit) day of December, 1996.
iLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

Sbotfe^L Mjgpins
A t t o r n e y s for A p p e l l a n t
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ADDENDUM
NONE.

